Almost eight months after the start of the conflict in the Middle East, energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s main oil artery—remain severely disrupted. Damage to the region’s energy infrastructure means that supply will recover only gradually, even if the Strait fully reopens. After easing over the summer amid a fragile ceasefire and hopes of a lasting peace agreement, Brent prices exceeded 100 dollars in October and at times even surpassed the late April peaks. Re-routing of flows, together with a contraction in global demand and the release of strategic reserves, helped contain the increase in crude oil prices. However, freight and insurance costs rose sharply, while bottlenecks in refining capacity have added pressure on refined product prices, with diesel prices doubling year-on-year. Gas markets are also tight, with TTF prices trading above 95 EUR/MWh in late October—more than three times their late February level. Futures point to gradual easing ahead, but oil product and gas prices remain well-above pre-war levels throughout the forecast horizon and low levels of strategic reserves and gas storage suggest that buffers to absorb further shocks are thin (Box I.3.1). Global headline inflation closely mirrored the energy market developments and, after easing over the summer, it surged again in September.
In response to inflationary pressures, central banks across the globe, including the US Federal Reserve, have started, or are expected, to raise policy rates, lifting short-term interest rates. The increase in interest rates has been steeper at the long end of the yield curve. At the cut-off date of this forecast, the 10-year US Treasury yield was at around 5.1%, up from 4.4% at end-April, and the 30-year yield exceeded 5.4%. Long-term yields in other advanced economies, notably the UK and Japan, also increased. Beyond intensified short-term inflationary pressures, this reflects the large supply of long-term debt issued both by official and private sectors, while central banks have turned net sellers of sovereign bonds (Box I.4.1). Meanwhile, equity markets have been volatile, amid rebounding oil prices and concerns about the profitability and financing of AI companies, which weigh on technology shares.
The global economy continued to expand in the first half of 2026, and the composite PMI still signals strong momentum in the third quarter. Merchandise trade also grew robustly, by 6% y-o-y in the first eight months of 2026, led by advanced, and emerging Asian economies. In the US, AI-related investment continued to expand vigorously, and large technology companies have further scaled up their investment plans. The Southeast Asian economies have also stepped-up investment, partly to meet rising demand from the AI boom. These developments have generated trade spillovers beyond the semiconductor industry and US-Southeast Asian trade, reflecting the geographically dispersed supply chains and the broad range of high- and mid-tech inputs required to build and equip data centres. Chinese exports also surged, with rising evidence of an ongoing reconfiguration of trade flows in response to US-China trade tensions (Box I.2.1). Global growth (excluding the EU) is forecast at 3.2% in 2026 and 3.6% in 2027 and 2028, with the 2027 pick-up largely driven by emerging market economies. Global trade (excluding the EU) is forecast to grow by 4.1% in 2026 and 5% in 2027, before moderating to 3.8% in 2028 as AI investment growth slows.
At 1.3%, the rate of expansion of the EU economy over the first three quarters of the year was higher than expected in spring. The upward surprise was largely driven by a strong rebound in exports, while consumption held up broadly as expected and investment came in slightly weaker.
Reflecting these developments on the demand side, after a prolonged period of weakness (Special Issue 1.), activity in manufacturing experienced a positive upswing, retail trade and services held steady, while construction activity broadly stagnated. By contrast, agricultural production was weak in the first half of the year and suffered further in the third quarter on the back of this summer’s heatwaves and droughts (Box I.5.1). Overall, these developments lift the EU growth forecast for 2026 to 1.4%—the same rate as in 2025. Economic activity is expected to expand by 1.4% also in 2027 and by 1.5% in 2028. Growth in the euro area is expected to reach 1.2% this year and next and move up to 1.3% in 2028. Potential output growth in 2026 in the EU is estimated at 1.4% and is expected to decrease over the forecast horizon and beyond. These estimates do not include any adjustment for the potential impact of AI on TFP (Box I.10.1).
In October, euro area inflation rose to 4.0%, from 3.8% in September.
Inflation was driven by energy prices, which surged by almost 21% y-o-y. Unprocessed food inflation also edged up to 4%, likely reflecting a delayed pass-through of higher energy and fertiliser costs, alongside disruptions to crops caused by the summer’s extreme weather events. Energy inflation is projected to moderate next year, as falling retail fuel prices more than offset the gradual rise in electricity and gas, due to the delayed transmission of high wholesale prices.
By contrast, unprocessed food price pressures are expected to intensify in the near term and gradually spill over to processed food prices along the supply chain. Moreover, higher energy costs are likely to feed through to the consumption basket (Box I.7.1). Still, second round effects are expected to remain contained against a backdrop of decelerating wages, while aggregate profit margins edge up marginally. Overall, headline inflation in the EU is expected to peak above 4% between the end of this year and the beginning of 2027. Annual inflation is set to reach 3.3% in 2026 and 3.2% 2027, before falling back to 2.3% in 2028. Euro area inflation is expected to follow broadly similar dynamics. As in the previous inflationary episode of 2022, lower income households are more exposed to high food prices and rising household energy bills, given the higher share of these essential items in their consumption basket (Special Issue2.).
Despite renewed inflationary pressures, medium-term market-based inflation expectations remained well anchored, reflecting markets’ confidence in the ECB’s ability to restore and ensure price stability. The euro area policy rates were raised by 25 bps. in both June and September. At the cut-off date of the forecast, markets expected three to four further increases, with the deposit facility rate peaking at around 3.4% by mid-2027. Longer-term interest rates had risen more markedly, broadly in line with developments in global bond markets. The 10-year German government bond yield, the euro area benchmark, stood at around 3.4% in September, compared with around 3.0% at the time of the Spring Forecast cut-off. The increase reflected both expectations of a higher path for short-term interest rates and higher term premia, partly associated with sustained government borrowing needs. Bond markets appeared to increasingly differentiate across sovereigns, reflecting differences in fiscal positions, with sovereign spreads widening across the EU. French government bond yields saw significant increases. Higher policy rates and long-term yields weigh on credit demand, while banks have also tightened their lending standards, adding to the restraint on credit supply.
The high-rate environment is set to weigh on residential construction, which is expected to broadly stagnate this year and recover only modestly over the next two years. In a context of continued excess demand, pressures on housing prices have continued to build up, raising social cohesion issues to greater prominence in some urban regions.
By contrast, non-residential construction, including public investment, is projected to keep expanding this year under impulse from the Recovery and Resilience Facility, but the momentum is set to weaken over the forecast horizon. Equipment investment, by contrast, is projected to keep expanding at a healthy pace this year, also supported by the rebound of manufacturing since spring, but decelerate in 2027. Other investment, which largely includes intangible assets, is set to keep expanding steadily over the forecast horizon, though at a slower pace than in the US, also reflecting weaker AI investment across Europe. Overall, investment is set to decelerate from a yearly growth rate of 2.6% in 2025 to an annual average of around 1.5% this year and next, before edging up towards the end of the forecast horizon. The combination of subdued investment growth and solid corporate balance sheets leads to continued excess of corporate saving over investment, consolidating the sector’s position as a net lender (Box I.5.2).
The EU labour markets are expected to employ more than 800,000 additional workers in 2026, even if employment growth is projected to remain subdued relative to output growth.
The implied elasticity of around 0.25–0.3, below its long-run average of close to 0.5, points to a less job-rich economic expansion than in previous years. Cyclical labour productivity growth is thus projected to return to around 1%. Despite adverse demographic trends (Box I.6.1), labour force growth is still set to increase over the forecast horizon, with activity rates nudging up to 66.7% by the end of the forecast horizon. The unemployment rate is expected to remain close to record lows, slightly above 6%, throughout the forecast horizon. Stability in the unemployment rate, nonetheless, masks an increase in unemployment among younger cohorts. A rising share of the youth cohort is also working fewer hours than they would like. While these developments point to some emerging weaknesses in the labour market, it is too early to establish a link with potential labour-market effects of AI adoption. Wages are projected to grow by 3.8% this year and 3.7% next year—marginally higher than expected in spring—and decelerate more notably in 2028. This implies positive real wage growth over the forecast horizon, though below productivity growth.
Over the forecast horizon, real disposable income is, however, projected to expand at a weaker pace than in spring, given the important increase in the cost of living. Private consumption growth is set to soften to 1.3% this year, weaken marginally to 1.1% in 2027 and move back to 1.3% in 2028, as decelerating inflation allows for stronger expansion of household purchasing power. The forecast for consumer spending is also conditional upon a small drop in the household saving rate, to 14.1% in 2028, still well above the pre-pandemic average of around 12%. Wealth effects play a marginal role in supporting consumption (Box I.4.2). After expanding at a projected rate of 1.9% this year, government consumption growth is expected to decelerate to just above 1% over the two years.
Following a strong rebound in the first half of the year, export growth is set to attain 3.2% this year and 2.8% in 2027, well above the growth rates expected in spring. It would then decrease to 2.3% in 2028. The strong global AI and electrification investment cycle supports the improved outlook for goods exports, with firms across the EU supplying power, cooling, and chip-making equipment. Imports are also seen higher, but still projected to decelerate over the forecast horizon, from 3.5% in 2025 to 2.3%. Re-alignment of export and import growth implies an almost neutral contribution of net external demand over the forecast horizon starting this year. The external balance of goods and services is affected by the negative terms of trade effect of this year’s surge in energy prices and is set to decline from 3.5% of GDP in 2025 to 3.1% this year, before moving up again to 3.4% by 2028. The services surplus (around 2% of GDP) accounts for most of the overall surplus, although total goods trade flows remain about twice as large as services trade flows.
Government deficits are set to rise markedly this year, as a result of increasing defence spending, rising interest expenditure, and some new measures to shelter households and firms from high energy prices. The EU aggregate general government deficit is set to increase from 3.1% to 3.6% this year, followed by further small increases in both 2027 and 2028—with a similar trend expected in the euro area.
While fiscal policy is overall slightly contractionary in 2027-28, and temporary measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of high energy prices are expected to be phased out, interest expenditure is set to rise steadily, from 1.9% of GDP in 2025 to 2.4% of GDP in 2028—the highest ratio for more than a decade. Although cohesion policy spending is set to increase gradually, the overall level of EU-funded expenditure is expected to decrease in 2027 as the RRF comes to an end. This contributes to the contractionary fiscal stance in 2027. Public investment remains stable as a percentage of GDP at historically high levels, bolstered by the continued rise of defence spending. The debt-to-GDP ratio is set to increase in the EU from 82.6% of GDP in 2025 to 85.6% in 2028. In the euro area, it is projected to increase from 88.6% of GDP in 2025 to 91.3% in 2028.
Risks to the outlook remain closely linked to geopolitical developments and persistently elevated uncertainty. Although the conflict in the Middle East has outlasted initial expectations, military action has eased.
Lower oil and gas prices following the US mid-term elections could, if sustained, materially lower the inflation outlook for 2027 and 2028, while marginally lifting economic activity in 2027. Closer to Europe, however, Russia’s protracted war of aggression against Ukraine and rising hybrid threats continue to undermine the security environment, with potential disruptions to supply chains, higher operating costs and weaker confidence.
Trade policy uncertainty also remains elevated, although deeper relations with EU partners such as the UK and Canada could provide some offset. Equity markets remain vulnerable to a correction given high valuations and market concentration, particularly in the United States. Renewed increases in long-term interest rates could add to fiscal pressures and weigh on growth. On the upside, faster AI adoption could boost productivity and potential growth, particularly in European manufacturing, while stronger investment in defence, infrastructure and industrial modernisation could support activity. Finally, more frequent and extreme weather events could continue to weigh on output and raise prices, through production losses and damage to natural assets and infrastructure. Faster implementation of structural reforms to address long-standing bottlenecks to EU competitiveness could unlock stronger growth. Finally, resolute progress in the energy transition to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported fossil fuels would further boost economic resilience.
Compliments of European Commission