Gunnercooke | Uncertainty for the Turnberry Framework: Transatlantic Business Must Adjust Strategy as the Heat in the Kitchen Rises

Overview

Firms with exposure to the US-EU international trade relationship cannot rely on last year’s Turnberry Agreement as a complete or settled solution for managing trade risk. Rather, they should ensure that their compliance practices and strategic visions are adjusted to account for recent and anticipated developments in the rollout of Turnberry as a framework. The promised return to relatively open terms of trade still needs time in the oven.

Turnberry framework and aftermath

When EC President Ursula von der Leyen and US President Donald Trump reached the Turnberry accord in Scotland in July 2025, it amounted to a diplomatic framework: more like a recipe on a card than a pan of fresh-baked cookies ready to enjoy.

Even when the US and EU formalized the framework into a joint declaration in August 2025, its substantive commitments lacked the imprimatur of legal force. But the Turnberry framework, intended as a stabilizing force for transatlantic relations after years of controversy on tariffs and market access, has been treated as a significant diplomatic initiative on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

In that sense, the recipe card sits prominently on the countertop, and both sides are gathering delicious baking ingredients. After all, if parties fully adopt implementing language, the EU will eliminate most tariffs on US industrial goods and extend market access treatment for many US fishery and agricultural products, while the US ensures a 15% ceiling on tariffs applied to EU goods.

Since recipe selection last summer, the February 2026 US Supreme Court decision in Learning Resources upset the baking plan. By removing the executive branch’s authority to impose tariffs on the permissive International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Court confined executive action to other more restrictive sources of statutory authority.

The Trump Administration pursued these sources of authority with a temporary 10% tariff across the board in February, and in March launched two investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. These investigations are expected to replace the temporary tariff around July 2026 and restore many of the tariffs that the Supreme Court struck down. The investigations pertained to forced labor and structural excess capacity and production respectively; both included European economies on a long list of investigatory targets. Section 301 authorizes investigation into acts and practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict US commerce. The law has no cap on the percentage or duration of the tariff, making it ideal for a durable tariff regime in the background during diplomatic negotiation.

Why the Turnberry framework is at risk

With the oven set to 301 degrees, the two governments in the kitchen must agree on each baking step. These developments since last summer have placed strain on the Turnberry framework, by posing questions as to the US dedication to the scope and ambition of the commitments. As the US heads into Section 301 hearings on April 28, 2026, a key question is whether the resulting tariffs on EU products will exceed the Turnberry limit of 15%.

The European Parliament addressed this risk when it adopted implementing legislation for Turnberry on March 26, 2026, with strengthened sunrise and suspension clauses. Rapporteur Bernd Lange indicated the Parliament was accepting the commercial terms “only after the United States has fully respected the terms of the agreement.” The suspension clause means if Section 301 tariffs exceed the Turnberry commitment, they will risk burning the cookies.

Another danger against the promised goodies of Turnberry reaching the cooling sheet is the US restructuring of metals tariffs under Section 232. Under the new “Section 232 Tiered Tariff” system implemented on April 6, 2026, the US is replacing the previous metal-content method with a tariff based on the full value of covered goods. Certain aluminum, copper, and steel products face a 50% tariff while derivative products are subject to 25%.

A temporarily reduced 15% tariff applies to certain metal-intensive industrial equipment through 2027. Aside from this provision, the Section 232 Tiered Tariff system sits at odds with the Turnberry framework. Although this could be a temporary conflict and negotiating tactic, with the EU adoption of implementing legislation it stands to question what further negotiation is needed before we can enjoy fresh Turnberry cookies.

Role of US Congress

The bakery is somewhat smaller than it might have seemed in July 2025. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Learning Resources decision, the Trump Administration needs Congressional action to adopt any new tariff legislation. Section 301 authority is already delegated and has survived numerous legal challenges.

However, the Turnberry framework has not been presented for ratification or adopted as a treaty or trade legislation within the US legal system. While many past trade deals were passed as congressional-executive agreements under an elaborately balanced process, Turnberry was a strictly executive-branch initiative. Although the Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs can be removed or reduced through executive action, it is at the discretion of the President and US Trade Representative whether to do so. The EU Parliament has hedged against this risk with a March 31, 2028, sunset that ensures the Turnberry concessions do not become permanent without future stakeholder impact analysis. While Congress could also address the issue, for example by extending the temporary 10% duties or voting on Turnberry directly, affected businesses should not hold their breath for such activity between now and November 2026.

Strategic checklist for affected business

For companies with transatlantic supply chains, the current environment demands both immediate compliance attention and strategic planning over a longer horizon. The tariff architecture is not static as it faces political, diplomatic, and legal modifications in real time. A business strategy should not be static either. Waiting for Turnberry to come out of the oven to check if it’s burned is not just a failure to mitigate: it is also a form of exposure.

• Evaluate product-specific exclusion opportunities. USTR established an exclusion request process when it adopted Section 301 duties against Chinese products in 2018. The same architecture is available for USTR to set up processes under the new investigations. USTR granted a significant number of the 53,000 requests for exclusion from the China tariffs. Although the general comment windows have closed for both investigations, companies should position themselves to engage immediately if a formal exclusion process is created. Companies can begin preparing a well-documented submission demonstrating economic harm, lack of domestic alternatives, and a weak nexus between the specific product and unfair trade practice. Such submissions are proven paths to reducing tariff exposure.

• Conduct a layered tariff exposure audit. Companies should map their product portfolios against the full current tariff landscape: Section 232 rates under the April 2026 restructuring, Section 122 surcharges through July 24, 2026, and the anticipated Section 301 tariffs applying soon after. The analysis should consider variable rate exposures across Section 232 tiers and any upcoming Section 301 structuring or product-specific exclusion eligibility requirements. The aluminum, copper, and steel products subject to a 50% tariff took many importers off guard.

• Assess forced labor supply chain risk. The forced labor investigation is not purely theoretical for EU-connected supply chains. Forced labor taints the entire supply chain in which it exists. Downstream goods incorporating inputs produced under forced labor conditions fall within USTR’s scope. Although the Section 301 investigation targets entire countries without an effective import ban, the investigation will also reveal specifics of forced labor and could lead to standalone administrative action under existing practices. US Customs and Border Protection has already issued 54 withhold release orders and eight findings that goods are banned from importation to the US due to the value-chain presence of forced labor. Companies with complex global supply chains in sectors such as textiles, chemicals, electronics, and agricultural inputs should update their documented forced labor risk assessments to limit exposure.

• Plan scenarios for Turnberry’s future. The Turnberry framework offers a potential ceiling of 15% for US tariffs on EU goods, but that ceiling is explicitly conditional. The EU’s safeguard mechanism requires the EC to monitor the impact of the new trade regime and allows temporary suspension of preferences if surging US imports cause serious damage to European industry. Firms should model three scenarios: (1) Turnberry holds and Section 301 tariffs are adjusted to the 15% ceiling; (2) Section 301 tariffs exceed 15% triggering the suspension clause; and (3) Section 232 tiered tariffs are renegotiated for EU derivative products, partially decoupling metals exposure from the broader Section 301 outcome. Each scenario has its own implications for costs, pricing, and sourcing decisions. In particular, firms should be prepared for the compliance and financial implications of increased tariffs on July 24, 2026, when the current tariffs are expected to be swapped out for higher tariffs.

• Engage trade counsel proactively. The forced labor and excess capacity Section 301 investigations are proceeding under a rapid timeline. Exposed businesses should engage trade counsel on advocacy strategies and ensure they avail themselves of any opportunities to weigh in. In particular, the notices identified sectors in the crosshairs including aluminum, autos, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, machinery, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, and steel. Firms in these sectors would benefit from lining up trade counsel before an exclusion process is opened.

by Luke P. Engan, Esq. Partner, US Customs and International Trade, GUNNERCOOKE LLP 

Compliments of Gunnercooke LLP – a member of the EACCNY